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█ Riassunto  L’interculturalità e i limiti di un ordine globalizzato. Alcuni spunti di riflessione sull’inevitabile in-
terferire della contingenza nelle umane istituzioni - In questo testo desidero discutere da un’ottica strutturale il 
punto di consistenza della differenza tra paradigma del multiculturalismo e paradigma dell’interculturalità. Il 
primo esprime se stesso come differenziazione tra ordini culturali, che prevede comunque la presenza di un or-
dine o di un meta-ordine globale, il quale governa, in qualità di fondamento universale, lo svolgersi della coesi-
stenza. Il secondo nega proprio questa possibilità, prevedendo come unica strada percorribile il lavoro contin-
gente e situazionale di “traduzione” da un ordine culturale a un altro. Questo testo si propone di valutare pro-
prio le ragioni in base alle quali del paradigma dell’interculturalità possa essere un candidato migliore per illu-
minare, ma anche per sottoporre a critica, la struttura titanica della globalizzazione. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Ordinamenti politico/culturali; Globalizzazione; Estraneità; Traduzione; Contingenza. 
 
█ Abstract  In this paper I wish to discuss at a structural level where the difference between the paradigm of 
multiculturalism and the paradigm of interculturality lies: whereas the first expresses itself in a differentia-
tion among cultural orders, which however contemplates the presence of a global or meta-order capable of 
functioning as a universal ground of commonness, the second exactly negates such a possibility, by allowing 
as the only viable practice the contingent and situated work of “translation” from one cultural order to the 
other. This paper assesses exactly why the intercultural paradigm may be a better  candidate in order to 
highlight and, at the same time, criticize the titanic structure of globalization. 
KEYWORDS: Cultural/Political Orders; Globalization; Alienness; Translation; Contingency. 
 
 
  
█ Introduction: from Multiculturalism to 
Interculturality 
 
Cultural, social and political orders, in or-
der to give shape, orientation and unitary sig-
nificance to the totality of elements they em-
brace, rely on the structural claim to be consti-
tuted as accomplished realms of sense.  
In this scenario, for any given order an en-
counter with other contrasting orders, which 
unavoidably imply its limitedness, might well 
represent a challenge; however, this does not 
really cause irreparable harm, if the structural 
paradigm under which order is conceived con-
tinues to be represented within the frame of 
totality.  
According to such a paradigm, the fact 
that a particular order lacks completeness 
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does not push it towards acceptance of its 
constitutive finitude; instead, it only calls for 
the intervention of a dialectical movement, by 
means of which every particularity and limit-
edness of this order, although – on the one 
hand – detected, is – on the other hand – nev-
ertheless bound to be overcome from the pre-
sumed position of an all-embracing total or-
der, which is able to mediate and contain 
within itself the whole set of differences and 
possible contrasting elements.  
Traditionally, this was the case for all those 
positions in which the plural expressions of 
human reason were related to the rule of a 
unique universal rationality or where context-
based forms of cultural manifestations were 
related back to the primacy of something like 
an all-encompassing human nature. Nowa-
days, such a dialectical paradigm hasn’t lost its 
power, despite an increasing accentuation of 
the irreducible nature of plural and multi-
dimensional life forms.  
Although it may sound absurd, quite the 
opposite is the case, since the operativity of 
this model can be well detected exactly in that 
same frame of discourse in which one may 
least expect its intervention, namely: the dis-
course relating multiculturalism to the process 
of globalization. Effectively, if we look atten-
tively at such a frame, the dialectical articula-
tion does appear as soon as one observes that 
multiculturalism is structurally defined in 
terms of a multiple set of life contexts, which 
are nevertheless potentially contained (and 
may be conciliated) into a global order, able to 
bring them together under a unitary com-
monality.  
Regardless of the attitude with which glob-
alization may be then conceived – either posi-
tively as a possible instrument of conciliation 
between cultural differences or conflicts given 
by the plurality of life forms;1 or negatively as 
the very cause responsible for the destruction 
of such plural forms of living2 – what doesn’t 
change, is the structural consistency under 
which this phenomenon is interpreted: either 
glorified or feared, globalization continues to 
be characterized by its peculiar capacity of 
comprehending the world as a unitary space 
of living, or even by producing the world as 
such a space.  
Thus, what is affirmed in such a discourse 
frame, at the end, is the very possibility of uni-
versality as a form capable of (somehow) em-
bracing every cultural plurality and particular-
ity in terms of a relationship between fractions 
and a whole. 3  
Exactly by doing so, however, what most 
discourses on multiculturalism and globaliza-
tion ignore or pretend to ignore is that every 
process of ordering implies a contingent gene-
alogy, that means: it implies the fact of its own 
institution; the fact that, since its foundation, 
order starts from “somewhere”4 and not from 
a non-localizable or ethereal position of a 
global/universal whole,5 from which order 
would derive and to which, therefore, it might 
also return.  
As a consequence of this, every institution 
of order must be understood as historical and 
ontologically limited, despite the “totalizing” 
pretensions it might have or it might want to 
achieve.6  
Under such a premise, therefore, globaliza-
tion cannot be understood as the self-
manifestation of the whole in itself, which 
might then enclose all particular orders, but 
rather it must be interpreted as the most ex-
treme pretention of universality stemming 
from a certain contingent-based configuration 
of order (mainly the Western one), and this in 
the attempt of its most exorbitant self-
projection.7  
From this assessment a further implication 
must be drawn: if every process of ordering is 
contingent and inevitably takes place within a 
given “here”, this also implies that every order 
is constitutively selective. And this means: in 
enclosing and including something, each pro-
cess of ordering must simultaneously exclude 
something else, which, therefore, can always 
challenge and threaten the order’s stability or 
its will to total expansion (or will to overcome 
every kind of “delimitation”).  
In this sense, that which is every time inev-
itably excluded in the process of ordering, can 
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be seen as an alien element, which structurally 
prevents order from a definite closure and 
thus keeps it in a permanent (historical and 
non-dialectisable) motion.  
Exactly here, along with the unmasking of 
its contextual (and non-universal) proveni-
ence, a structural limitation must also be as-
cribed to the project of globalization as far as 
the very possibility of realization of its totality 
pretension is concerned. In fact, if every or-
dering process is constitutively selective and 
always related to a limiting alterity, then the 
globalization project must also unavoidably 
refer to an insuperable alterity which breaks 
its will of absoluteness and unitarity.          
Now, the whole set of introductory reflec-
tions, I have just made, allow us to better cir-
cumscribe the real frame of the issue I want to 
highlight: if we aim at adequately understand-
ing the reason why every order perceives its 
radical contingency and feels structurally chal-
lenged to the utmost as soon as it is called to 
face alterity, then we should not so much refer 
to the above described model of multicultural-
ism, but rather to the situation of inter-
culturality, namely: the situation which de-
scribes the confrontation with alien orders or 
other configurations of life taking place here 
and now from the perspective of a given order,8 
and not from the safe and neutral position of-
fered by a presumed third mediating party.9  
In the situation of interculturality, what 
happens, indeed, is that the given order, far 
from being simply faced by that which can be 
merely defined as an extrinsic “other” or a 
“stranger” to be overcome, discovers through 
means of this same confrontation an alienness 
in the midst of its own selfhood.  
In other terms, the confrontation with the 
alien reminds every order of its constitutive 
contingent foundation, i.e. of the fact that the 
given order, cannot simply perform final 
translations from an “outside” towards an “in-
side”, since there is no such thing as an origi-
nal model as tertium comparationis, but rather 
is and is bound to remain the inevitable and 
constantly unaccomplished result of its own 
“inner” translation, namely a translation that, 
since the beginning, has been producing order 
from the stand point of the original non-
availability of a foundation model.  
In this sense, foundation, as the basic non-
proper and  non-appropriable element within 
order’s constitution, displays the very first 
characterization of alienness within order, 
which calls for a process of original and never-
ending self-translation.      
The connection between translation and 
alienness, that the paradigm of interculturality 
discloses, can therefore be considered as a 
fruitful model through which the constitution 
of every order can be understood through its 
structural features of historicity, contingency 
and original relatedness to alterity. Hence, in 
the following pages, I will attempt to better 
circumscribe this connection and develop it 
through its structural traits. 
 
█ Translating Orders: from the Overcoming 
of the Alien to its Responsive Encounter 
 
The operation of translation, which I have 
chosen here as the guiding concept for this 
paper, can be basically described as follows: on 
the one hand, there is my own tongue or cul-
ture which is familiar, common to me; and, on 
the other hand, there is, opposite to mine, the 
stranger(’s) tongue/culture.10  
Translating means to make understanda-
ble in my own/proper codes what is otherwise 
not understandable (unfamiliar to me). To 
put it in other words: translating a stranger(’s) 
culture means reducing it to what I can under-
stand under my own/proper culture. And this 
also explains why we speak about “appropria-
tion”.  
However, exactly this operation of transla-
tion, which reduces the alien to what is famil-
iar to me, gives rise to a pivotal problem: in 
translating haven’t I neglected (to “translate”) 
the most peculiar element of what I translate, 
namely: haven’t I missed the being alien (al-
ienness) of what is alien, the unfamiliarity of 
what is unfamiliar?  
This element is not secondary if we take in-
to account the fact that, maybe, the reasons of 
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the alien take their strength, significance and 
justification exactly from that same place which 
appears unfamiliar/alien to us, and that we re-
duce or lose in/by the translation process.  
An example of the peculiarity of the al-
ienness of the alien can be grasped if we ana-
lyze the process of translating stranger’s prov-
erbs (or idiomatic expressions) which make 
sense only in the stranger’s tongue, which – 
again – take their significance from that same 
place that appears stranger (alien) to us.11  
As soon as, by translating, we remove their 
strange(r)ness (alienness), we “risk” removing 
them as such.  
Leaving this specific example aside, a cru-
cial question arises: how to translate cultures 
and yet avoid their reduction? The question at 
stake here is how to deal with the alienness of 
the alien without “dissolving it”12 or “without 
robbing its alienness”.13  
Of course, in order to understand we must 
translate! Nevertheless, this does not prevent 
us from looking at translation in a different 
way, namely as a response to the alien and not 
as an overcoming of it.14 In other words, trans-
lation is not a final re-solution/dis-solution of 
the alien, where the alien element is consid-
ered as something transitory that can and 
must be overcome; on the contrary, transla-
tion can be approached as a process that can 
never fully “reach” and appropriate the alien. 
Jean-Luc Nancy’s words convey perfectly the 
disturbing element represented by the alien: 
«its coming never ends: it continues coming, 
and it never stops being somehow an intru-
sion».15  
On this basis, the alien element demands a 
“permanent work of translation”,16 an effort 
that becomes aware of its ontological incom-
pleteness. Instead of claiming its conformi-
ty/faithfulness to the original, and viewing the 
work through the alien as a temporary state – 
at the end of which the access to the original is 
to be achieved – the act of translation accepts 
the origin(al) as an alien and realizes the impos-
sibility of “regaining”  immediate access to it.17  
The alien is no longer the intermediate 
state that, once overcome through “transla-
tion”, enables us to close the circle, to establish 
a full appropriation of sense; rather it is what 
keeps the circle open and therefore requires a 
constant process of translating as response.  
In this sense the German philosopher 
Bernhard Waldenfels writes: “The request of 
the alien does not have a sense and does not 
follow any rule, rather it provokes the sense by 
upsetting the given sense references and by 
breaking the rule systems”.18 
Therefore, the only way of relating to the 
alien, thereby avoiding its reduction, is the re-
sponse imposed by the appeal/disturbance 
coming from the same alien. This is the real 
event of responsivity:  
 
The alien becomes what it is in no other 
place than in the event of responding; this 
means that it never allows itself to be com-
pletely and univocally defined. That which 
we answer to surmounts always that which 
we give in/as the answer. What is alien 
does not allow itself to be answered like a 
definite question or solved like a definite 
problem.19  
 
Thus, what must be taken as alien is  
 
that to which we answer and inevitably 
have to answer, therefore as a request, 
challenge, stimulus, call, appeal/demand 
(Anspruch) [...] All looking at (Hinsehen) 
and listening to (Hinhören) would be an 
“answering looking at and listening to”; all 
speaking and acting would be a kind of 
“answering” behavior.20 
 
Viewed like a process of responding, trans-
lation can really be described as a scene of clo-
sure of order which leaves space for the open, a 
will to appropriation which undertakes the in-
evitable route of expropriation, a will to power 
which is submitted to the trial of fragility.  
This statute of translation does not refer 
only to the sphere of the alien as “out of the” 
own, but rather to a form of alienness that also 
involves our own identity. This alienness man-
ifests itself as the impossibility of having im-
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mediate access to an original and pure self.  
In other words, what I think to be familiar 
and common to me, what I call my own cul-
ture and my own self, with which I identify 
myself and think I have immediate access to, 
is not at all so. Instead, it is a product of a 
basic and constant translation: a making fa-
miliar – an appropriation – of something 
which is originally alien and therefore that ex-
propriates me from the possessing of myself.  
Discovering this original alienness is to be-
come aware of the fact that a transparent 
ownness is only a phantom of the fulfillment 
of the desire21 of possessing myself totally and 
not the original and actual ground where I 
move from. This sense of alienness within the 
own is what we can read in the Dionysiac of 
Nietzsche,22 in the Unheimlich of Freud,23 in 
Merleau-Ponty’s description of the experience 
of delay in the living-present,24 in the posteri-
orité de l’anterieur by Lévinas,25 in Derrida’s 
supplement of origin,26 and in the whole work 
of Waldenfels.27  
This last author shows clearly that in every 
crucial experience in which I identify myself as 
my own self, the alienness is present like a 
“goad”28 (Stachel):  
 
my experience of time goes back to the 
original experience of my birth, to an orig-
inal past, a ‘past which has never been pre-
sent’ (Merleau-Ponty), and that is never 
my present as I always come too late in or-
der to be able to catch it in flagranti […] 
Also the name that I have and I hear call-
ing, I received it from others […]; it has 
been spoken to me before I spoke to oth-
ers. […] The fright in front of one’s own 
image, the one that comes from the mirror 
or from a photo and that in extreme cases 
can lead to suicide attempts, would be in-
conceivable if “I” were simply “I” or if I 
could always fully return back to myself. I 
encounter myself under the gaze/glance of 
the others.29 
 
The primacy and irreducibility of the alien 
is what the translation experiences as a scene 
that cannot be closed, a scene that re-proposes 
itself both outside of the subject and inside of 
it,30 or more appropriately expressed: the alien 
proposes itself outside of the subject – and 
does it always in a problematic way – because 
inside the subject, in the sphere of the own, at 
the origin, this same alien abides.  
 
█ Order and its “Horror Alieni” 
 
Once having described the articulation of 
this thought in the sphere of the subjective 
self, it is quite easy to imagine how relevant it 
could be in the realm of interculturality: in 
fact, if there is no full experience of own-ness 
at the origin, if what is called own-ness is a 
work of translation through and with an orig-
inal alienness, what fails is the presumption of 
having a solid basis upon which one stands 
and from which one thinks to perform a trans-
lation regarding only the other’s culture.  
It is exactly this kind of unquestioned cer-
tainty, which gives a clear priority to the own, 
that gives rise to the attitude which guides all 
those kinds of traditional operations which, 
even if they, on the one hand, foresee an indu-
bitable participation or intervention of the al-
ien, on the other hand, return too easily to the 
own self, since nothing can deeply question 
and upset the own if, since the beginning, it 
has been recognized and guaranteed in its hi-
erarchical priority or higher originarity.  
Along this line of thought we encounter 
Hegel’s dialectic, in which alienness appears 
only as Entfremdung, i.e. as a transitory form 
in a process in which consciousness tends at 
“overcoming the being alien” and “at discover-
ing” the world and the present “as property”.31  
This is also the case with Gadamer’s her-
meneutics, whose task, despite its weaker pre-
tentions if compared to the Hegelian project, 
remains that of overcoming the alien,32 that is 
the recuperation of comprehension as the 
more originary condition, in which the own-
ness of sense is to be presupposed to every in-
terruption produced by an alien incompre-
hension.33  
The same strategy is also at work in the 
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communication discourse of Habermas, which, 
by starting from the presupposition of a com-
mon logos, common sense and communicative 
reason, does not allow the intervention of any 
radical alien, but only the participation of a rel-
ative alien,34 who can therefore always be part 
of a successful strategy of inclusion.35  
In this sense, Habermas’ communicative 
strategy, by founding itself on the premise of a 
given symmetrical reciprocity of the partici-
pants, far from giving itself as an “interrealm 
of dialogue” (Zwischenreich des Dialogs)36 be-
tween own and alien, works as a dialogically 
staged monologue.37 
This does not however negate the exist-
ence of what is called “the own” or, more spe-
cifically, “own culture”, but rather expresses 
the notion that the access to one’s own culture 
always involves in its deepest roots, and not 
only derivatively, a relation to alienness.  
This is not difficult to demonstrate if we 
agree upon the fact that nobody’s culture can 
claim an isolated development for itself, 
namely without relating to other(s’) cultures.38  
Of course, again and again we see exam-
ples where communities or societies strongly 
affirm a pure own origin in which only they 
were  involved. What is nevertheless very sus-
picious is that each of these affirmations has 
been and is always accompanied by hostility 
towards the alien, that is, xenophobia.  
Why does the absolute and privileged af-
firmation of one’s own culture, legitimized on-
ly by the exhibition of a pure and exclusive 
origin – that must be consequently immedi-
ately accessible – always slip into hate towards 
the alien? Isn’t it maybe because this xénon (al-
ien) is that which inhabits the original core of 
own-ness and therefore, by hindering a com-
plete affirmation of the own, must be at any 
cost repressed or “annihilate[d]”?39    
Concerning this problem of communities 
affirming their own identity against the alien 
the intellectual effort of Rada Ivekovic is very 
enlightening. Therefore it seems to me highly 
appropriate to approach the conclusion of 
these insights with one of her most poignant 
observations: 
The formation of new identities is pro-
duced and accompanied by new narrations 
which allow the communitarian self-
representation, re-foundation and homog-
enization. The origin (starting from the 
other) must be therefore dissimulated. […] 
It is in this way that it happens that a vio-
lent (political) subject comes into shape. It 
gives itself a closed and autistic identity, 
which refuses any exchange and difference, 
[…] an objective identity which demands 
the sacrifice. The sacrifice of the other.40  
 
This is the point in which every communi-
tarian order pretends to have achieved for it-
self its total self-reference and, therefore, the 
state of no need for any translation. However, 
if alienness – as I said above – is constitutive, 
this situation of presumed total self-
referentiality of order cannot really get rid of 
alienness.  
In fact, exactly in these cases of extremely 
desired and planned communitarian autism, a 
peculiar kind of “shrewdness of alienness” 
takes places; a shrewdness that manifests itself 
in the simple and inevitable fact that «whoev-
er builds walls, builds them not only against 
others, but also against him/herself».41  
In this sense, even globalization, despite its 
will to embrace all cultures and break all 
boundaries, in its project of constructing a 
self-referring world and in its universal autism 
(in which everything and everyone would ap-
pear familiar and own), cannot avoid its pecu-
liar forms of boundaries42 or walls.  
These walls, no matter how much they 
might want to hide themselves behind the 
same universal pretention of overcoming any 
limit, nevertheless do exist and are effective, 
and they show themselves, for instance, in all 
those forms of clear limitation, decrease and 
impoverishment of human life in terms of a 
reduction in the variety of experience.  
Of course, these self-limiting walls are 
hardly perceivable as long as one keeps living 
driven by the guiding need or obsession of 
protection from what may appear unfamiliar 
and stranger. And what’s more (and clearly 
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more dangerous), these limiting walls may not 
only remain unperceived, but they might even 
be glorified as battle barricades, as soon as the 
need of protection starts turning into an ex-
plicit “horror alieni”,43 whose outcomes – as 
we well know – have been experienced more 
than enough along the path of our contempo-
rary history. 
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is historically contingent [my emphasis]; legal or-
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places, organised as such in terms of the overall 
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